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Abstract
Small-world networks (SWN) are found to be closer to the real
social systems than both regular and random lattices. Then, a model
for the evolution of economic systems is generalized to SWN. The Sz-
najd model for the two-state opinion formation problem is applied to
SWN. Then a simple definition of leaders is included. These models
explain some socio-economic aspects.
Keywords: Small-world networks; Evolutionary economic models; Opin-
ion formation models.
1 Introduction
The diffusion of a new concept (a technology, an opinion, an information, a
disease, ...) through social and economic systems is a complex process that
typically forms waves or avalanches. Also, it usually displays rich dynam-
ics that is attracting the interest of many mathematicians and theoretical
physicists [1].
A social network has two main properties: clustering and small-world
effect. Clustering means every one has a group of collaborators, some of them
will often be a collaborator by another person. Small-world effect means the
average shortest person to person (vertex to vertex) distance is very short
compared with the whole size of the system (number of vertices).
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Regular lattices display the clustering property only. On the other hand,
random lattices display the small-world effect without clustering [2]. The
concept of SWN introduced in [2,3] has shown to combine both features. A
SWN is a connected ring with some shortcuts joining between some randomly
chosen vertices are added with small probability φ. Also, this structure
combines between both local and nonlocal interactions. This combination is
observed in many real systems. Then it is a useful concept in modeling the
real systems. We used this concept in modeling different systems [4-8]. Here
our interest is restricted to apply the concept of SWN to a model for the
evolution in economic systems [8] and to a sociophysics model [7].
2 A model for the evolution of economic sys-
tems in SWN
A real economic system is a population of agents each of them has a tech-
nological level (ai). Every agent is assumed to interact with a group of
collaborators (neighbours) obtaining payoffs (profits). The base payoff is as-
sumed to be higher for the higher technological levels, and the payoffs have
to be bounded. Also, if an agent is too advance or too backwards relative to
his/her neighbours, he/she always has incompatibility costs.
Every agent has to update his/her technological level to obtain the best
payoff. Then the population reaches a state at which each agent is satisfied
with his/her payoff. Then the technological level of a randomly chosen agent
is raised by a quantity ∆ ∈ (0, 1). Usually the new technology has a cost.
The neighbours of this agent updates their technological levels according to
the new conditions. They have the possibility to accept or refuse the new
technology. The new technology may diffuse through the whole population
making a uniform front for cheap updating cost. On the other hand, if the
cost is very high, only few agents can modify their levels. For intermediate
cost values, the updating process continues through the population making
an avalanche until another stable state is reached, and so on. The avalanche’s
size, s is the number of agents that updated their levels in a step. It has been
shown that [9] the avalanches size and several aspects of social and economic
systems can be described in terms of power law distribution as,
P (s) ∝ s−γ, γ ≥ 1. (1)
There are two updating optimalities: Nash and Pareto defined as follows:
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Definition 1. (Nash optimality): An agent selects the technological level
that maximize his own payoff without regards to his/her collaborators.
Definition 2. (Pareto optimality): An agent selects the technological level
that maximize the average payoff of his/her group (he/she and the collabo-
rators).
Towards a theoretical approach to this phenomena, Arenas et al. [10]
introduced the following payoff function:
pi(ai, aj) =
{
ai − k1(1− exp − (ai − aj)) if ai ≥ aj,
ai − k2(1− exp − (aj − ai)) if ai < aj ,
j = i± 1, (2)
where k1 and k2 represent the incompatibility costs resulting from being
too advance or too backwards, respectively. The payoff of the agent i, pii is
pii = pi(ai, ai−1) + pi(ai, ai+1). Depending on this payoff function, Arenas et
al. [10] construct a 1-dimensional (1-d) model using Nash optimality. But
Pareto optimality usually implies less erratic behaviour than Nash optimality
[5]. Also, it has been proven that the payoff from Pareto updating rule is
generally higher or equal to that from Nash updating rule [11].
Then we have reconstructed the 1-d model of Arenas et al. using Pareto
optimality [8]. It is shown that [8], the dynamics this model depends only
on the quantity k = k1− k2, which behaves as the updating cost. For k ≤ 2,
the avalanches are of the size of the whole population corresponding to the
case of uniform front. In the limit k →∞, the agents behave independently,
so avalanches become of size one. For intermediate values of the parameter
k, the system is shown to be critical, see Fig. (1), where k = 4. The three
regimes are clearly observed in real systems.
The total payoff of each agent is calculated and compared in two cases,
Pareto optimality and Nash optimality. Applying the same conditions in
the two cases, it is found that the total payoff from the Pareto optimality is
significantly higher than that from the Nash optimality for all agents. This
important result means that if every one in a population tries to maximize
the payoff (profit, fitness, ...) of his/her group, the personal payoff of each of
them may be more maximized than that of the case when every one tries to
increase his/her own payoff individually.
Then the model is generalized to SWN with φ = 0.05. The shortcuts are
fixed beforehand. The updating rule is Pareto. The vertices that do not have
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shortcuts behave similar to the 1-d model. If a vertex i has a shortcutting
neighbour sc(i), then its payoff is calculated as follows:
pii = pi(ai, ai−1) + pi(ai, ai+1) + pi(ai, asc(i)). (3)
In this case the average payoff of its group becomes:
piav = (pii−1 + pii + pii+1 + pisc(i))/4. (4)
The application of the model to SWN does not destroy the criticality of
the model for intermediate values of the parameter k. In the limits k ≤ 2
and k →∞ the model on SWN behaves as the same as the 1-d model.
The total payoff of each agent was calculated. The 10 % of agents who
have shortcuts are found to have significantly higher payoff than the others.
This is because of the presence of the third term in Eq. (3) for calculating
the payoff of those agents. This behavior increases the deviation in payoffs
which exists in the real economic systems. This contradicts the both cases
of the 1-d model (with both Nash and Pareto updating rules), where the
payoffs of all agents are close to each other. Also, it implies that the increase
of collaborators may increase the payoff, if agents use the Pareto optimality.
3 Application of the Sznajd sociophysics model
to SWN
The simple Ising model is one of the fundamental concepts of Statistical
Mechanics. Recently, it has been modified to model the problem of two-state
opinion formation [12-14]. Depending on an old principle that says ”united
we stand, divided we fall”, the Sznajd model [12] is constructed. Consider
a chain of spins Si, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , L, that are either up (+1) or down (−1).
Assume that each pair of adjacent spins can affect the state of their nearest
neighbors using the following updating rule:
if SiSi+1 = +1, then Si−1 = Si+2 = Si,
if SiSi+1 = −1, then Si−1 = Si+1, Si+2 = Si.
(5)
Simulating this system for long time, where at each time step the site i is
selected randomly, one obtains finally one of the following three fixed points:
↑↑↑ . . ., ↓↓↓ . . ., ↑↓↑↓ . . . with probability 0.25, 0.25, 0.5, respectively. Then
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the model has two possible final states: dictatorship or stalemate, so no
common decision in a democratic way can be done. Only after introducing
a small finite noise, a democratic decision can be done.
This model is generalized to 2-d [13] obtaining similar fixed points, except
in some variants. Also, it is used to explain the distribution of votes among
candidates in the Brazilian local elections [14].
We generalized the Sznajd model to SWN [7]. The updating rule is
generalized to include the shortcutting neighbors, if exist, as follows:
if SiSi+1 = +1, then Si−1 = Si+2 = Ssc(i) (if exists)
= Ssc(i+1) (if exists) = Si,
if SiSi+1 = −1, then Si−1 = Ssc(i) (if exists) = Si+1,
Si+2 = Ssc(i+1) (if exists) = Si
(6)
where sc(i) is the shortcutting neighbor of the i-th vertex, if exists.
Beginning with a totally random initial state, the system always reaches
one of two fixed points all up or all down with equal probabilities. Also,
the effects of the initial concentration of the up and down spins is studied
[7]. Although the stalemate fixed point disappeared in this model, the model
always evolves to limiting dictatorship fixed points. So no democratic deci-
sion can be taken in this system. This point is improved by introducing the
concept of a leader.
A leader is usually a strong person who completely trusts in his/her opin-
ion. Also, he/she is always capable in influencing somebody to follow his/her
thought without changing. As a simple definition for a leader, we define a
leader as a person who does not change his/her opinion and has the capabil-
ity of influencing one of his/her nearest neighbors to accept the same opinion
as the leader.
We randomly choose two persons to be leaders, one for the up direction
and the other to the down direction. The updating rule is the same as
Eq. (6). The same numerical investigation is reapplied to this modified
model. No fixed point is observed in this system. The time evolution of the
magnetization, (M = 1
L
∑L
i=1 Si) is drawn [7]. Sometimes the majority of the
population follow the up direction, and another times the majority follow the
down direction. There is no dependence on the initial concentrations for the
up and down followers. There is no periodicity observed. Also, this behavior
is independent of the lattice size.
Because of the disappearing of the dictatorship fixed points, a decision can
be done in a democratic way. This behavior is clearly observed in many local
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elections in many democratic countries. For example, sometimes the majority
is for the Democratic party and others the majority is for the Republic party,
without reaching a state at which 100% of the population follow a certain
opinion. Also, this behavior is not periodic. Similar behavior is observed
from both 1-d and 2-d versions of Sznajd model after including some noises.
An interesting question is what will happen if one of the two leaders is
killed or forced to slough his leadership by any way? In this case the system
evolves into a single dictatorship fixed point following the opinion of the
leader that is still alive, independent of the concentrations of each opinion
at the killing process. This explains why dictators usually kill the active
objectors members, and gives a warning to leaders, they have to prepare
some leaders for the future. The model is investigated using time series
analysis [7].
4 Conclusions
In conclusion, SWN is a good description for real social networks. It allows
some simple mathematical models to display some interesting socio-economic
aspects.
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Figure 1: A log-log plot for the probability distribution function of
avalanches’ sizes P (s) versus the avalanches’ sizes s for the 1-d model us-
ing Pareto optimality. A power law behaviour is obtained with exponent
γ = 1.99, for k = 4. The results are averaged over ten independent runs on
a 1-d lattice of size 1000 updated for 6× 106 time steps.
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